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Introduction
The year 2009 involved a substantial number of significant cases at all levels and several
legislative proposals, but as in 2008, there were few significant statutory enactments. Sim-
ilar to 2008, enacted legislation addressed appropriations for 2010 and non-controversial
programs, such as those for religious workers, physician waivers of the home foreign resi-
dency requirement, and the Visa Waiver Program. This article focuses primarily on case
law and administrative developments in immigration law during 2009. Specifically, this
article covers significant case law developments; worksite enforcement, 1-9 audits and E-
verify programs; Federal First Offender Act eligibility under Lujan-Armendariz; and issues
related to asylum, including asylum for foreign domestic violence victims.
I. Worksite Enforcement, Increased Audits/Investigations, E-Verify Push
for 2010
A. 1-9 DOCUMENT COMPLIANCE
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a new 1-9 form to increase the
security of the employment authorization verification process.' Under the Immigration
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1. Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security (DHS)-U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (US-
CIS), Questions and Answers: USCIS Revises Employment Eligibility Verification Form (Feb. 11, 2009),
available at http-/www.uscis.gov/files/article/I9_qa_12decO8.pdf.
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and Reform Act, Form 1-9 is required for all employees hired after November 6, 1986 to
confirm identity and work eligibility. This requirement is set forth in section
274A(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
In February 2009, a new 1-9 form was released with a more restricted list of acceptable
documents. A revised 1-9 form was released on August 7, 20092 and the M-274 Handbook
for Employers was also updated.3 The new 1-9 form streamlined the list of acceptable
documents and no longer allows expired identity documents such as an expired driver's
license or an expired U.S. Passport. The failure to complete and retain 1-9 forms can
result in criminal and civil penalties for the employer. 1-9 compliance for technical errors
can result in $110 to $1,100 fines per 1-9 form, and substantive violations can result in
fines from $375 to $16,000.4
In April 2009, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a renewed
focus of its resources in worksite enforcement, targeting employers who knowingly hire
illegal workers as well as continued efforts for the arrest and removal of criminal aliens. 5
In 2008, out of 6,000 detentions, only 135 employers were arrested. This represented a
shift from Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) raids toward the distribution of
Notices of Inspection to hundreds of employers. The strategy states:
Enforcement efforts focused on employers better target the root causes of illegal im-
migration. An effective strategy must do all of the following: 1) penalize employers
who knowingly hire illegal workers; 2) deter employers who are tempted to hire ille-
gal workers; and 3) encourage all employers to take advantage of well-crafted compli-
ance tools. To accomplish these goals, ICE must prioritize the criminal prosecution
of the actual employers who knowingly hire illegal workers because such employers
are not sufficiently punished or deterred by the arrest of the illegal workforce.6
B. 1-9 AuDTrr INCREASE
The year 2009 brought in a new wave of compliance audits and investigations, ranging
from administrative fines to criminal arrests for companies from ICE, the agency created
in 2004 under the DHS and charged with the role of conducting investigations into com-
panies' hiring records and 1-9 policies. Since the new ICE enforcement strategy initiated
in April 2009, ICE has issued 142 Notices of Intent to Fine, totaling $15,865,181. By
2. DHS-USCIS, Form 1-9, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/form/i-9.pdf (last visited Aug. 7, 2009).
3. DHS-USCIS, Handbook for Employers, available at http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/m-
274.pdf (last visited July 31, 2009).
4. Inflation Adjustment for Civil Monetary Penalties Under Sections 274A, 274B, and 274C of the Immi-
gration and Nationality Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 10,130 (Feb. 26, 2008) (to be codifiedat 8 C.F.R. pts. 270, 274a, 280,
1274a, and at 28 C.F.R. pt. 68).
5. Press Release, DHS-Imnigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), Worksite Enforcement Strategy
(Apr. 30, 2009), available at http//www.ice.gov/docib/pi/news/factsheets/worksite-strategy.pdf.
6. Memorandum on Worksite Enforcement Strategy from DHS Office of Investigations to Directors and
Agents in charge at ICE (Apr. 30, 2009), available at http-J/www.ice.gov/doclib/foialdro-policy memos/
worksite-enforcement-strategy4_30-2009.pdf.
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comparison, in 2008, ICE issued only thirty-two Notices of Intent to Fine, totaling
$2,355,330.7
In July 2009, Krispy Kreme Doughnut Corporation was fined $40,000 for 1-9 violations
for a store location in Ohio. ICE audited Krispy Kreme's 1-9 forms after receiving reports
of illegal workers at its factory in Ohio. The company also agreed to provide a revised
immigration compliance program and implement procedures to ensure immigration
compliance.8
C. FORM 1-9 AuDrrs
A Notice of Inspection (NOI) issued to a company requires surrender of 1-9 forms
within three business days, absent an extension in certain circumstances for large
employers.
On July 1, 2009, DHS issued 652 notices to companies nationwide, and notices con-
tinue to be served. ICE sent notices to specific industries, including hospitality, construc-
tion, meatpacking, and restaurants. On November 19, 2009, ICE announced that another
1,000 NOIs were being sent to companies. By comparison, ICE sent out only 503 similar
notices in 2008. John Morton, DHS Assistant Secretary for ICE stated, "ICE is commit-
ted to establishing a meaningful 1-9 inspection program to promote compliance with the
law."9 Mr. Morton referred to the auditing of the 1-9 forms as "only the first step in ICE's
long-term strategy to address and deter illegal employment."'o These audits reflect a shift
toward focusing on employers instead of the undocumented employees. ICE will con-
tinue to investigate employers using 1-9 form audits to ensure that they are in compliance
with all immigration laws.
D. UNANNOUNCED ScrE AuDrrs FOR EMPLOYERS
In 2010, H-lB employers should be prepared for unannounced site visits from U.S.
Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) to confirm the information submitted in
H-lB filings. After a 2008 internal study revealed that as many as twenty-one percent of
H-lB petitions were defective in some way, USCIS modified the H-lB 1-129 form in-
structions to authorize the release of company information related to the visa petition."
As part of an effort to prevent visa fraud, the USCIS Office of Fraud Detection and
National Security (FDNS) commenced an audit of the H-lB program.12 As a part of the
audit program, investigators are visiting H-lB employers to verify the accuracy of the
information in the H-lB petition. FDNS does not need a subpoena to investigate H-lB
7. Press Release, DHS-ICE, ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton Announces 1,000 New Workplace
Audits to Hold Employers Accountable for their Hiring Practices (Nov. 19, 2009), available at http://
www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0911/091119washingtondc2.hon.
8. Press Release, DHS-ICE, Krispy Kreme Fined After 1-9 Audit (July 7, 2009), available at http://
www.ice.gov/pi/nr/0907/090707cincinnati.htm.
9. ICE Assistant Secretary John Morton, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. DHS-USCIS, Form 1-129, available at http-J/www.uscis.gov/files/form/I-129.pdf.
12. American Immigration Lawyers Association, Types of USCIS Site Visits, AILA InfoNet Doc. No.
09112060 (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.ails.org/content/default.aspx?docid=30610.
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employers. Cooperation by the company is voluntary. Legal counsel is allowed if time
permits because a site visit is not usually able to be rescheduled.
During these unannounced site visits, the investigators may request to speak with the
company representative who signed the H-lB petition to confirm information contained
in the H-lB petition, including the employee's job title, salary, work location, education
background, employer's business, and revenue. The investigator may also speak with the
H-lB employee and the H-lB employee's supervisor. The investigator may also request
to take photographs of the employer's facility.
Employers should review H-I B petitions submitted for employees and ensure the accu-
racy of the information contained in the petition and confirm that the terms and condi-
tions of the employee's employment have not changed. Also, employers must pay the
prevailing wage for the position according to the work location stated on the Labor Con-
dition Application (LCA). LCA violations can result in fines from $1,000 (including
$5,000 for willful violations and up to $35,000 if a U.S. worker is displaced). A site visit
can also open up a company to other violations and scrutiny from other government agen-
cies, including the IRS, DOL, and OSHA.
Legislation has been proposed to overhaul the H-1B and L-1 visa programs and in-
crease restrictions, but this remains in congressional committee.13
E. E-VERIFY PROGRAM EXPANSION
E-Verify has gained momentum and support by DHS. In late October, Congress
passed H.R. 2892, the Department of Homeland Security 2010 Appropriations bill, which
allocated $42.8 billion to DHS. This included a three-year extension of E-Verify and $137
million in funding designed to improve the accuracy of E-Verify operations.14
In September, the Federal Acquisition Regulation was implemented which requires cer-
tain federal contractors to use E-Verify, based on FAR federal contracts of $100,000 and at
least 120 days in duration, and subcontracts flowing from the principal contract for ser-
vices of at least $3,000.15
In November, DHS launched an ad campaign, encouraging all employers to voluntarily
sign up for its online employment verification system that uses data from DHS and the
Social Security Administration (SSA) to confirm identity and work eligibility for new
hires.16 The campaign, called "I E-Verify," will use public service television ads to tout
the 170,000 companies that currently use the system.
Companies using database systems such as E-Verify, the Social Security Number Verifi-
cation System offered by the SSA, electronic 1-9 form systems, and background checks,
should become familiar with the systems in order to avoid verification discrimination.
13. See Govtrack.us, S.887: H-lB and L-1 Visa Reform Act of 2009, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/
bill.xpd?bill=sl 11-887 (last visited Nov. 26, 2009).
14. See Department of Homeland Security 2010 Appropriations, Pub. L. No. 111-83 Stat. 2142 (2009)
(formerly H.R. 2892).
15. See generally Federal Acquisition Regulation, https://www.acquisition.gov/far/ (last visited Jan. 31,
2010).
16. Press Release, Global Immigration Counsel, USCIS Announces Increased Enforcement and Compli-
ance Initiatives, Including Issuance of 1,000 Additional Notices of Inspection (Nov. 19, 2009), available at
http://www.globalimnigrationcounsel.com/2009/l l/articles/us-immigration/uscis-announces-increased-en-
forcement-and-comphance-initiatives-including-issuance-of-1000-additional-notices-of-inspection/.
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Verification-related discrimination can result when misuse occurs, such as illegal pre-
screening and premature termination.' 7 Employers can face civil penalties for refusing to
hire an individual based on their nationality or immigration status.
II. Case Law Developments
A. SIGNIFICANT BIA AND SUPREME COURT CASES
1. Adjustment Of Status
In Matter of Silitonga,is the Board of Immigration Appeals (the Board, or BIA) held that
an Immigration Judge (IJ) does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate an application for ad-
justment of status filed by an arriving alien, unless the alien has been placed in removal
proceedings after returning to the United States pursuant to a grant of advance parole in
order to pursue a previously-filed application. Thus, in most cases, "the USCIS has exclu-
sive jurisdiction to adjudicate an arriving alien's application for adjustment of status under
8 C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(1)," and "it retains jurisdiction to adjudicate the application even
where an unexecuted administratively final order of removal remains outstanding."19
2. Cancellation of Removal
In Matter of A-M-,20 the Board held that notwithstanding the heading of section
240A(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), which refers only to nonperma-
nent residents, a lawful permanent resident who qualifies as a battered spouse may be
eligible to apply for cancellation of removal under section 240A(b)(2). It further held that,
given the nature and purpose of the relief of cancellation of removal for battered spouses
under section 240A(b)(2), such factors as an alien's divorce from an abusive spouse, remar-
riage, and previous self-petition for relief based on the abusive marriage are relevant in
determining whether an application for that relief should be granted in the exercise of
discretion.21
3. Criminal Convictions
In Nijhawan v. Holder,22 the Supreme Court held that for purposes of defining crimes
involving fraud or deceit as aggravated felonies under the INA, the $10,000 loss threshold
amount refers to the specific circumstances in which the defendant committed a fraud or
deceit crime, rather than to the generic definitions of the fraud or deceit crime.
In Matter of Zorilla- Vidal,23 the Board held that outside the jurisdiction of the Ninth
Circuit, a conviction for criminal solicitation under a State's general purpose solicitation
statute is a conviction for a violation of a law "relating to a controlled substance" under
17. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b (2008) (prohibiting national origin discrimination during the employment
process).
18. 25 I. & N. Dec. 89 (BIA 2009).
19. Matter of Yauri, 25 1. & N. Dec. 103 (BIA 2009).
20. Matter of A-M, 25 1. & N. Dec. 66 (BIA 2009).
21. Id.
22. Nijhawan v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2294 (2009).
23. Matter of Zorilla-Vidal, 24 I. & N. Dec. 768 (BIA 2009).
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section 237(a)(2)(B)(i) of the INA where the record of conviction reflects that the crime
solicited is an offense relating to a controlled substance.
In Matter of Caredenas Abreau,24 the Board held that a pending late-reinstated appeal of
a criminal conviction does not undermine the finality of the conviction for purposes of the
immigration laws.
4. Definition Of "Child" And "Parent"
In Matter of Guzman-Gomez,2 5 the Board held that the terms "child" and "parent" de-
fined at section 101(c) of the Act do not encompass stepchildren and stepparents, and that
a person born outside of the United States cannot derive U.S. citizenship under section
320(a) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 143 1(a) (2006), by virtue of his or her relationship to a non-
adoptive stepparent.
5. Detention
In Matter ofM-A-S-, the Board held that an IJ may order an alien detained until depar-
ture as a condition of a grant of voluntary departure. 26
6. Due Process
In Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-,27 the Attorney General vacated the earlier
decision in. Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C-,28 and pending the outcome of a
rulemaking process, directed the Board and the Js to continue to apply the previously
established standards for reviewing motions to reopen based on claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel.
7. Motions
In In re Hashmi,29 the Board held that "[an alien's unopposed motion to continue ongo-
ing removal proceedings to await the adjudication of a pending family-based visa petition
should generally be granted if approval of the visa petition would render him prima facie
eligible for adjustment of status."
In In re Lamus, 30 the Board held that a "motion to reopen to apply for adjustment [of
status] based on a marriage entered into after the commencement of removal proceedings
may not be denied under the fifth factor enumerated in Matter of Velarde," based on the
mere fact that the DHS "has filed an opposition to the motion, without regard to the
merit of that opposition."
24. Matter of Caredenas Abreau, 24 I. & N. Dec. 795 (BIA 2009).
25. Matter of Guzman-Gomez, 24 I. & N. Dec. 824 (BIA 2009).
26. Matter of M-A-S-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 762 (BIA 2009).
27. Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C, 25 1. & N. Dec. I (A.G. 2009).
28. Matter of Compean, Bangaly & J-E-C, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009).
29. In re Hashmi, 24 1. & N. Dec. 785 (BIA 2009).
30. Matter of Lamus-Pava, 25 1. & N. Dec. 61 (BIA 2009) (citing In re Velarde-Pacheco, 23 I. & N. Dec.
253 (BIA 2002)).
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8. Removability/Inadmissibility
In Matter of Barcenas-Barrera,31 the Board held that "[an alien who willfully and know-
ingly makes a false representation of birth in the United States on a passport application is
inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the INA," and that an individual "convicted
of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542 for falsely representing that she was born in the United
States on an application for a passport, is removable under section 237(a)(1)(A) of the Act"
based on being "inadmissible at the time of her adjustment [of status]under section
212(a)(6)(C)(ii)."
In Matter of Espinoza, the Board held that "[a]n alien may be rendered inadmissible
under section 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) of the INA on the basis of a conviction for possession or
use of drug paraphernalia," and that such an alien "may qualify for a waiver of inadmissi-
bility under section 212(h) of the Act if that offense relates to a single offense of simple
possession of 30 grams or less of marijuana."32
9. Stay Of Removal
In Nken v. Holder,33 the U.S. Supreme Court held that traditional stay factors governed
a court of appeals' authority to stay an alien's removal pending judicial review, as opposed
to the more demanding standard of the INA.
10. Waivers Of Inadmissibility
In Matter of Moreno-Escobosa,34 the Board held that "[t]he date of an alien's plea agree-
ment . . . is controlling in determining" an alien's eligibility for a section 212(c) waiver,
and that the Ninth Circuit's holding in Abebe v. Mukasey,35 "does not invalidate 8 C.F.R.
§ 1212.3 (2009), so as to preclude an alien who seeks to waive a deportation ground from
establishing eligibility for section 212(c) relief."
B. FEDERAL FIRST OFFENDER AcT ELIGIBILITY UNDER LUJAN-ARMENDARIZ
In Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, the Ninth Circuit held that an expungement of a first-time
conviction for simple drug possession under a state law that is analogous to the Federal
First Offender Act (FFOA)36 eliminates the effect of the conviction for immigration pur-
poses.37 In three new cases issued this year, the Ninth Circuit continued to flesh out its
holding in Lujan-Armendariz by concluding, either directly or obliquely, that: (1) a con-
31. Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 1. & N. Dec. 40 (BIA 2009).
32. Matter of Espinoza, 25 1. & N. Dec. 118 (BtA 2009).
33. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749 (2009).
34. Matter of Moreno-Escobosa, 25 1. & N. Dec. 114 (BIA 2009) (citing Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203
(9th Cir. 2009)).
35. Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203 (9th Cir. 2009).
36. Federal First Offender Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 3607 (LexisNexis 2006) [hereinafter FFOA]. The FFOA is a
federal rehabilitative statute that entitles persons who have never previously violated narcotics laws, and who
are found guilty under federal or state law of first-time simple drug possession, to have the charges dismissed
without entry of a conviction and avoid having their offenses used against them for any purpose. Id. § 3607(b)
(providing that a case disposed of under the FFOA "shall not be considered a conviction for the purpose of a
disqualification or a disability imposed by law upon conviction of a crime, or for any other purpose").
37. Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d 728, 735 (9th Cir. 2000).
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viction for possession of drug paraphernalia that is merely incidental to drug use does not
preclude a non-citizen from invoking the FFOA's protection; (2) FFOA relief is categori-
cally unavailable to a non-citizen who has violated a condition of probation; (3) serving a
probationary jail term likely does not disqualify a non-citizen from FFOA eligibility; and
(4) a guilty plea to a first-time offense of simple drug possession cannot serve as an admis-
sion of a controlled-substance offense for immigration purposes as long as the offense is
expunged and the expungement applies retroactively to a date preceding the issuance of a
final administrative order.38
11. Possession of Drug Paraphernalia
The express terms of the FFOA make post-conviction relief available only to individuals
who have received a conviction for possession of a "controlled substance," as described 21
U.S.C. § 844.39 Although possession of drug paraphernalia is not an offense described in
Section 844, the Ninth Circuit held in Ramirez-Altamirano v. Holder that a finding of guilt
for the lesser or equivalent offense of possession of paraphernalia also qualifies for FFOA
treatment.40 In that case, a non-citizen initially charged with both felony drug possession
and misdemeanor possession of drug paraphernalia later pleaded guilty only to the lesser
drug-paraphernalia charge.4' The court observed that if the non-citizen had instead pled
guilty to the more serious drug possession charge, his conviction would have qualified him
for relief under the FFOA: "[t]he structure of his plea agreement obviously was intended
to minimize his culpability by allowing him to avoid facing the more serious drug posses-
sion charge, and reflects the state's view as to the seriousness of the offense."42
The court reasoned that "there is no rational basis for treating individuals found guilty
of possessing drug paraphernalia more harshly than those found guilty of possessing the
actual drugs themselves."43 Therefore, the court held that "persons convicted for posses-
sion of drug paraphernalia. . . are eligible for the same immigration treatment as those
convicted of drug possession under the FFOA."44 Under this holding, a non-citizen in-
voking the FFOA in order to avoid the immigration consequences of a conviction must
demonstrate that, among other things, the conviction was for possession of a controlled
substance, or for an equivalent or lesser charge. 45
Importantly, the court distinguished the less serious offense of possession of the instru-
ments used for delivering or administering an illicit drug to the body from the more seri-
ous offense of possession of the machinery, supplies, or ingredients used for
manufacturing a controlled substance.46 The court suggested that, given the differing
gravity of the offenses, the policy rationale of equal protection that supports the
38. See RamiTez-Altamirano v. Holder, 563 F.3d 800, 803, 808-00 (9th Cir. 2009); Estrada v. Holder, 560
F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Estrada v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009).
39. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a).
40. Ramirez-Altamirano v. Holder, 563 F.3d 800, 808-09 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Cardenas-Uriarte v. INS,
227 F.3d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 2000).
41. See Ramirez-Altamirano, 563 F.3d at 808.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 809.
45. Id. at 812 (citing Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137-38).
46. Id. at 808-09 (citing Cardenas-Uriarte, 227 F.3d at 1137 n.6).
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equivalent treatment of drug possession and possession of drug-delivery paraphernalia
does not apply to possession of drug-manufacturing paraphernalia.47 Nevertheless, as
long as the paraphernalia at issue is merely "incidental to drug ingestion," a conviction for
possession of such drug paraphernalia will not preclude a non-citizen from invoking the
FFOA's protection. 48
12. Violations of Probation
Another core eligibility requirement for FFOA relief is compliance with all conditions
of probation imposed as a result of a conviction for simple drug possession or an
equivalent or lesser charge. 49 In March 2009, the Ninth Circuit held in Estrada v. Holder,
that a non-citizen who has violated his probation may not benefit from the FFOA's pro-
tections.50 In that case, a non-citizen sought to qualify for a waiver of separate grounds
for removal by invoking the FFOA on account of the expungement of his conviction for
possession of drug paraphernalia.5 The petitioner had been convicted'for possession of
drug paraphernalia in violation of a California law and was placed on probation for three
years. 52 Although the petitioner eventually succeeded in setting aside and vacating his
guilty plea, the state court had twice found that the petitioner had violated the terms and
conditions of his probation.53
The Estrada court observed that the FFOA did not provide for dismissal or expunge-
ment of a conviction for an offender who violated the terms of his or her probation.54
Accordingly, the court declined to grant the petitioner FFOA relief, reasoning that "be-
cause Estrada would not have been entitled to FFOA relief as a federal defendant, his
California expungement does not negate his conviction for immigration purposes."55
13. Imprisonment
The Ninth Circuit has not yet resolved whether serving jail time in connection with a
conviction for simple drug possession precludes a non-citizen from taking advantage of
the FFOA's protection. Although the question arose in Ramirez-Altamirano, where the
non-citizen served jail time for his guilty plea to misdemeanor possession of drug para-
47. See id.
48. Id. at 809.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3607(a) (stating, with respect to qualifying convictions, that, "At the expiration of the term
of probation, if the person has not violated a condition of his probation, the court shall, without entering a
judgment of conviction, dismiss the proceedings against the person and discharge him from probation").
50. Estrada v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); accord Sanchez-Morfin v. INS, 85 F.3d 637,
1996 WL 157512, at *2 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that a petitioner had "placed himself beyond" the stat-
ute's protection by violating the terms of his probation before completing an Arizona expungement program
because the FFOA "does not seem to help probation violators").
51. Ertrada, 560 F.3d at 1041.
52. Id. at 1041.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1042.
55. Id. at 1041 (citing Aguiluz-Arellano v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 980, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2006); Paredes-Ur-
restarazu v. INS, 36 F.3d 801, 812 (9th Cir. 1994)).
SPRING 2010
444 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
phernalia,5 6 the court expressly declined to decide whether "his five-day jail sentence would
have precluded him from qualifying for expungement under the FFOA."s?
Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has intimated that serving jail time would not likely
disqualify a non-citizen from eligibility for FFOA treatment.58 This result makes sense
from the perspective that disqualifying a non-citizen from FFOA eligibility based on jail
time associated with an expunged conviction for first-time drug possession would violate
the equal-protection guarantee advanced in Lujan-Armendariz.5 9 But if jail time were
treated as a bar to FFOA treatment, then a first-time drug-possession offender who ex-
punges his conviction by first serving his sentence and thereafter obtains a vacatur might
face various negative immigration consequences, whereas any other substantively similarly
situated offender in a state utilizing an alternative procedure would not face such conse-
quences. Imposing consequences on an offender merely on account of a procedural varia-
tion would nearly eviscerate the FFOA's legislative purpose of ensuring "that the various
harsh consequences that normally flow from a criminal conviction would not affect indi-
viduals found guilty of a first-time simple drug possession offense."60
14. Guilty Pleas
A non-citizen may be considered as having a "conviction" of a controlled-substance
offense for immigration purposes if he or she was "convicted of," "admits to having com-
mitted," or "admits committing acts which constitute the essential elements" of the of-
fense.61 This year, the Ninth Circuit determined in Romero v. Holder that a non-citizen's
"guilty plea in connection with his expunged, first-time simple possession offense [cannot]
serve as an 'admission' of a controlled substance offense once that offense [is] expunged." 62
This case dealt with an IJ's decision finding a non-citizen statutorily barred from dem-
onstrating the good moral character required for non-resident cancellation of removal on
account of his guilty plea to a first-time offense of simple drug possession, despite a subse-
quent expungement of the plea under a state rehabilitative statute.6 3 The court reasoned
that to allow the use of Romero's "guilty plea which preceded the expungement of the
offense to constitute an 'admission' of a controlled substance offense would attach a legal
consequence to the expunged offense,"64 which result would contravene Lujan-
Armendariz's holding that "the [FFOA's] ameliorative provisions apply for all purposes." 65
56. Ramirez-Altamirano, 563 F.3d at 803.
57. Id. at 812 (emphasis added) (observing that the BIA had failed to address this question in its decision).
58. See Lujan-Armendariz v. INS, 222 F.3d at 734 n.11, 738 n.18 (though not holding directly on the issue,
explaining that an "expungement" sufficient for FFOA treatment includes "vacaturs" or "set-asides," in which
"a formal judgment of conviction is entered after a finding of guilt, but then is erased after the defendant has
served a period of probation or imprisonment and his conviction is ordered dismissed by the judge").
59. See id. at 736-37 (citing H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 828, 104th Cong., 2d Sess., at 224 (1996)) (holding that
equal protection requires substantively similar but procedurally different expungements to be treated simi-
larly for the purposes of the FFOA and observing that Congress sought to ensure uniform treatment of
expungements received "under substantively similar but procedurally different state statutes").
60. Id. at 736.
61. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (2006).
62. Romero v. Holder, 568 F.3d 1054, 1061 (9th Cir. 2009).
63. Id. at 1056.
64. Id. at 1060.
65. Id. at 1060 (quoting Lujan-Armendariz, 222 F.3d at 735).
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Therefore, the court concluded that Romero was not statutorily barred from proving
good moral character because of his subsequently expunged guilty plea to a first-time
simple drug-possession offense under state law. 66
Notably, the timing of the expungement of Romero's plea played a significant role in
the ultimate disposition of the case. Indeed, in February 2003, after the BIA had already
dismissed Romero's appeal from the IJ's decision, Romero filed a motion to reopen based
on new evidence showing that, after he had successfully completed the drug-rehabilitation
program, the state court set aside his guilty plea and dismissed the charge against him in
an order nunc pro tunc retroactive effect to October 7, 1999.67 In view of these facts, the
Ninth Circuit held that Romero's expungement entitled him to FFOA treatment.68
Presumably, a contrary result would have occurred in Romero had a final administrative
decision been entered with respect to Romero's cancellation application before the effec-
tive date of the expungement. Indeed in two earlier cases, the Ninth Circuit held that a
non-citizen who may be eligible in the future to receive expungement of a conviction for
first-time simple drug possession under a state rehabilitative program cannot benefit from
FFOA treatment if he or she has not yet received such relief by the time that immigration
consequences have been imposed as a result of the conviction. 69
Reading the Ninth Circuit's recent decision in Romero in light of these earlier cases
suggests at the very least that a guilty plea to a first-time offense of simple drug possession
cannot serve as an admission of a controlled-substance offense for immigration purposes
as long as the offense is expunged and the expungement is given retroactive effect predat-
ing the final conclusion of the administrative proceedings, as was the nunc pro tunc order in
Romero. Whether a plea that is expunged before the issuance of a final administrative
order is also eligible for FFOA treatment in the absence of retroactive application is a
question that the Romero case leaves open to future adjudication.
IV. Asylum Developments
U.S. asylum law is dynamic, and this year, the decisions relating to the refusal to recog-
nize gang recruitment as a "particular social group," the interpretation of the statutory
language relating to the so-called "persecutor bar," and the much-awaited asylum for "for-
eign victims of domestic violence" have been seminal and innovative.
A. "PAR-ncuLAR SocIAL GROUP"
In 2008, both the BIA and the Ninth Circuit had refused to recognize a particular social
group of "persons resistant to gang recruitment." 70 An interesting development, however,
has been made towards the definition of disfavored groups. Following its application of
the disfavored group analysis to the asylum claim of a member of Indonesia's Chinese
66. Id. at 1062.
67. Id. at 1058.
68. Id. at 1062.
69. See Padilla-Medel v. Gonzales, 197 F. App'x 617, 619 (9th Cir. 2006); Chavez-Perez v. Ashcroft, 386
F.3d 1284, 1290 (9th Cir. 2004).
70. See Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542, F.3d 738, 745-46 (9th Cir. 2008); In re S-E-G, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579
(BIA 2008); In re E-A-G-, 24 1. & N. Dec. 591 (BIA 2008).
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Christian minority in Sael v. Ashcroft,71 the Ninth Circuit applied the same analysis to the
withholding of removal claim of a member of Indonesia's Chinese Christian community
in Wakkary v. Holder.72 This analysis helps to "lower proportion of specifically individual-
ized evidence of risk, counterbalanced by a greater showing of group targeting that an
applicant must adduce to meet the ultimate standard under the regulations, 'individually
singled out' rubric." 73 Furthermore, an applicant does not need to show that he or she is
"individually singled out for persecution," if he or she can prove a "pattern of practice of
persecution of a group of persons similarly situated to the applicant on enumerated
grounds."74 The Ninth Circuit has also found that there is a pattern of persecution of
homosexual men in Jamaica. 75
B. "PERSECUTOR BAR", PAST PERSECUTION, AND "CENTRAL REASON"
In Negusie v. Holder,76 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the persecutor bar provision in
the Immigration and Nationality Act was ambiguous as to whether coercion or distress
was relevant in determining if an alien had participated in persecution. It further held that
the Board's construction of the persecutor bar as not requiring any motivation or intent
on an alien's part was not entitled to Chevron77 deference because it was based on legal
error. The Court remanded for further proceedings. Negusie indicates that the "intent"
to persecute should exist independent of coercion, and being coerced to persecute should
not be judged by the same standard as independent, intentional persecution.
In Matter ofA-T-,78 the Board held that requests for asylum premised on past persecu-
tion related to female genital mutilation (FGM) must be adjudicated within the framework
set out by the Attorney General,79 and that once past persecution on account of an enu-
merated ground is shown, a presumption is triggered that there would be future harm on
the basis of the same statutory ground.
Also, in Parussimova v. Mukasey, the Ninth Circuit determined that "a motive is a 'cen-
tral reason' if the persecutor would not have harmed the applicant if such motive did not
exist," or if "standing alone," the motive "would have led the persecutor to harm the
applicant."80 The court clarified that "persecution may be caused by more than one cen-
tral reason, and an asylum applicant need not prove which reason was dominant," as long
as the applicant can "demonstrate that a protected ground was 'at least one central rea-
son.'" 81 In addition, internal relocation will be presumed impossible if the asylum appli-
cant proves that he or she was subjected to government-sponsored persecution, unless the
government can rebut with a preponderance of evidence establishing the contrary. 82
71. Sael v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d. 922 (9th Cir. 2004).
72. Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d. 1049 (9th Cir. 2009).
73. Id. at 1064.
74. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13 (b)(2)(iii); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13 (b)(2)(iii).
75. Bromfield v. Holder, 543 F.3d. 1071 (9th Cir. 2009).
76. Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159 (2009).
77. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
78. In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (A.G. 2008).
79. See Matter of A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (AG. 2008).
80. Parussimova v. Mukasey, 555 F.3d 734, 741 (9th Cit. 2009).
81. Id.; see also Sinha v. Holder, 564 F.3d 1015, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).
82. Brezilien v. Holder, 569 F.3d 403, 414 (9th Cit. 2009).
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C. CHANGE OF COURSE: ASYLUM VICTORIES A REAL POSSIBLITY FOR VicTIMs OF
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
For immigrant victims of domestic violence and their advocates, 2009 will be
remembered as the year that DHS finally acceded to granting asylum to Rody Alvarado
Pefia, a Guatemalan woman who endured decades of horrific physical and mental abuse at
the hands of her husband. The decision by DHS, a well-deserved victory for Ms. Alva-
rado, marks an important change in the government's stance towards domestic violence-
based asylum claims and opens the door a bit wider to other victims of abuse seeking
refuge in the United States. Ms. Alvarado's protracted legal battle, spanning more than
thirteen years and three administrations, came to symbolize the plight of abused women
seeking asylum in the United States, who traditionally experience disfavored treatment by
the U.S. government.
1. The Social Group Formulation in Asylum Claims
All foreign nationals face a formidable task when applying for asylum in the United
States. Applicants must establish they are "refugees" within the meaning of the INA.83 A
"refugee" must show he or she is "unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable and
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of [their country of national-
ity]. . .because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."84 It is
possible to establish eligibility for asylum based upon past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution if the persecution is on account of one of five enumerated
grounds.85
Persecution on account of membership in a social group is one of these grounds. 86 In
Matter ofAcosta, the BIA interpreted the phrase "persecution on account of membership in
a particular social group" to mean:
Persecution that is directed towards an individual who is a member of a group of
persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared charac-
teristic might be an innate one such a sex, color, or kinship ties, or in some circum-
stances it might be a shared past experience such as former military leadership or land
ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that will qualify under this
construction remains to be determined on a case by case basis. However, whatever
the common characteristic that defined the group, it must be one that the members
of the group either cannot change, or should not be required to change because it is
fundamental to their individual identities of consciences.87
83. See Immigration and Nationality Act §208(b)(1)(B)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(i) (2009).
84. Id. §101(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2009).
85. In re Chen, 20 I. & N. Dec. 16 (BIA 1989).
86. See DHS Supplemental Brief at 7, Matter of L-R-, (Board of Immigration Appeals Apr. 13, 2009),
available at http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/pdfs/Redacted%20DHS%20brief%2Oon%20PSG.pdf; see also Karouni
v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1171-72 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding that all alien homosexuals are part of a particu-
lar social group); Vumi v. Gonzales, 502 F.3d 150, 154-55 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing membership in a
nuclear family as a social group).
87. Matter of Acosta, 19 1. & N. Dec. 211, 233 (BIA 1985). See also, e.g., In re Fauziya Kasinga, 211. & N.
Dec. 357 (BIA 1996) (defining social group with immutable characteristics such as gender, youth, member-
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To obtain asylum based on this ground, an applicant must: (1) specify the particular
social group; (2) show that he or she is a member of that group; and (3) show that he or
she has a well-founded fear of persecution based on his or her membership in that
group.88 Traditionally, victims of domestic violence seeking asylum, such as Ms. Alvarado,
attempt to formulate their claims upon persecuted social group grounds.
2. A Painful Past
On October 28, 2009, in a one-paragraph supplemental filing in Ms. Alvarado's case,
DHS stated that Ms. Alvarado was "eligible for asylum" and that she "merits a grant of
asylum as a matter of discretion," thereby ending more than a decade of litigation in her
case.89 In 1996, an IJ found Ms. Alvarado credible and granted her asylum based on perse-
cution she feared because of her "membership in a particular social group of 'Guatemalan
women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male companions, who be-
lieve that women are to live under male domination.'"90 Nevertheless, three years later,
the BIA reversed the IJ's decision, finding that Ms. Alvarado's social group formulation
failed because, although Ms. Alvarado was clearly a member of that group, she did not
demonstrate how the group's characteristics were understood by members of her society
nor had she proven that "male oppressors see their victimized companions as part of this
group."91 In a telling statement, the BIA declared that "[tihe solution to [Ms. Alvarado's]
plight does not lie in our asylum laws as they are currently formulated" and instead rec-
ommended that she seek relief from removal under a separate section of law.92
On January 19, 2001, Attorney General Reno vacated the BIA's decision and directed
the Board on remand to stay reconsideration until after the publication of proposed regu-
lations that sought to clarify the definitions of persecution and membership in a particular
social group.93 On February 21, 2003, Attorney General Ashcroft certified the Board's
decision for review, but remanded the case on January 19, 2005, again directing the Board
to reconsider its decision "in light of the final rule."94 The proposed rules never material-
ized, and Ms. Alvarado's asylum claim and those of countless other victims of domestic
violence were placed on hold pending a decision in Ms. Alvarado's case. It was not until
September 25, 2008, that the presiding Attorney General lifted the stay imposed on the
BIA and remanded the case for reconsideration of the issues presented by asylum claims
based on domestic violence. 95
ship in a particular tribe, and opposition to female genital mutilation); In re C-A-, 23 . & N. Dec. 951 (BIA
2006) (stating that "a past experience is by its very nature, immutable, as it has already occurred, and cannot
be undone").
88. Lopez-Soto v. Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 228, 235 (4th Cir. 2004).
89. See DHS Response to the Respondent's Supplemental Filing of Aug. 18, 2009 at 1; Matter of R-A-, 24
I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
90. Matter of R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 911 (BIA 1999) (citing Immigration Judge Decision of Sept. 20,
1996).
91. Id. at 918.
92. Id. at 928.
93. Matter of R-A-, 22 1. & N. Dec. 906 (A.G. 2001).
94. Matter of R-A-, 23 1. & N. Dec. 694 (A.G. 2005).
95. Matter of R-A-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 629 (A.G. 2008).
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3. Time for Change
In an April 2009 supplemental brief, submitted to the BIA in a separate asylum case
involving an abused woman from Mexico, the DHS laid the groundwork for its decision in
Ms. Alvarado's case.96 The government offered for the first time "alternative formulations
of 'particular social group' that could, in appropriate cases, qualify aliens for asylum or
withholding of removal."97 The formulations serve as guidelines for practitioners and
advocates seeking to define their client's social group.
According to DHS, a particular social group is "best defined in light of the evidence
about how the respondent's abuser and her society perceive her role within the domestic
relationship." 98 The key is to identify: (1) the characteristics the persecutor targeted in
choosing his victim;99 (2) the immutability of the applicant's status within the domestic
relationship or the constraints that made it impossible for the victim to leave the relation-
ship;1oo and (3) the social perceptions in that particular country regarding domestic vio-
lence.' 0 In other words, applicants must establish that their persecutors viewed them as
subordinates and that this behavior was socially acceptable.102 The brief warns against
social group formulations that are "impermissibly circular" or those that "are centrally
defined by the existence of the abuse they fear." 0 3 Ultimately, the brief marks an impor-
tant change in the government's traditional stance towards social group asylum claims and
proposes that victims of domestic violence may form part of a cognizable social group. In
any case, DHS's position is a welcomed development for abused foreign nationals seeking
safe haven in the United States.
96. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 86.
97. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
98. Id. at 14.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id. at 16.
101. Id. at 14.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Id. at 6 (noting that "[tlo allow such circularity in defining a particular social group - individuals are
targeted for persecution because they belong to a group of individuals who are targeted for persecu-
tion-would not be true to the refugee definition in U.S. Law and the treaties on which it is based . . . ").
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